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Legislation
THE MODEL REAL PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION LAw.'-Municipalities, heavily burdened by the cumulative tax delinquency of the past
decade, must find some way of lessening the strain that threatens to
disrupt their credit.2 Like the federal and state governments, they
have assumed responsibility not merely for large emergency relief
projects, but for a permanent enlargement of governmental equipment
and services; meanwhile they have continued to depend for the bulk
of their resources upon the rigid general property tax,^ which contracts
with deflated real estate values in times of greatest need. Both the uneconomic nature of this tax and the frequency of inequitable assessment
valuations 4 have aggravated the critical state of municipal credit, but
the major responsibility lies with inefficient collection, which has obstructed the receipt of taxes in good times as in bad. The lack of flexible
arrangements for payments by taxpayers in real financial distress has
frozen indefinitely their capacity to pay. At the same time inadequate
penalties and lax enforcement against voluntary delinquency have demoralized the certainty and promptness of all tax receipts and vitiated
efforts at tardy enforcement. While unpaid taxes have been recorded
in municipal accounts as "assets," they have been refused as security
for short-term loans to municipalities already burdened with a large
floating indebtedness.
Caught in a vicious circle, with indebtedness constantly leading
receipts, local governments have resorted to costly financing methods,
such as tax anticipation warrants, issuance of bonds at high interest
charges and consumption of reserves. Meanwhile the effectiveness of
any enforcement of liens by tax sales has been largely nullified by the
traditional leniency of the courts toward such sales. Where the accumulated taxes amounted to more than could be realized from a tax sale,
the government could resort to the dubious remedy of purchasing the
property, thus removing it from its own tax rolls. In the case of voluntary delinquency it has frequently been under the necessity of accepting
reduced cash payments from taxpayers who have meanwhile enjoyed

I This analysis is based upon a paper read before the Special Committee on
Municipal Law at the American Bar Association convention, July 17, 1935.
2 The tax delinquencies of certain representative cities had mounted to nearly
19% in 1932, whereas 15% is regarded as the maximum margin oi safety. Other
evidence of mounting delinquency is cited in the compiehensive ;tudy Administration of Mfunicipal Credit (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 925. Representative data for
1932-1933 indicated an avcrage delinquency of over 20%. Report on Tax Delinquency (1934) 27 PRoc. NAT. TAx Ass'N 319, 330.

3 The available statistics show that sixty to seventy per cent of local revenues
are still derived from this tax. See Notes (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924. 928: (1934)
27 Ponc. NAT. TAx Ass'N 356.
4 See Enslow, H. R., Tax Collection and Adjust ment Plans (1935) 13 TAX
MAc. 531.
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the use of their money for other purposes without penalties. The fruitlessness of late enforcement in the first instance, and the substitution
of concessions for penalties in the second, 5 have accustomed the taxpayer to lax enforcement, with deplorable effects on subsequent collections. No private business could survive if it showed the same leniency
toward its debtors that municipal governments have extended to their
taxpayers, including those who were well able to pay.
The Model Real Property Tax Collection Law,6 sponsored by the
National Municipal League, is concerned with ensuring effective collection. The authors seek to prevent the translation of the temporary
financial straits of the taxpayer into the permanent financial straits of
the municipality by a flexible collection system of four instalments
within a unified tax calendar, without discounts and with graduated
penalties for delinquency. The law would thus seek to prevent involuntary delinquency by allowing a rigid tax obligation to be liquidated
through deferred payments. 7 Having facilitated such liquidation, it then
provides for expeditious enforcement of a lien in the event of delinquency, the finality here being justified by the leniency in the first stage
of collection. The tax collector may, however, adjust the method of
enforcement to the varying situations that may arise. If the tax has
been delinquent for more than six months, he may act as receiver ex
officio of the rents and income of the property, provided it be neither
residence nor farm property, and apply them to the payment of delinquent taxes. If the tax is still delinquent on the October first following
the end of the fiscal year in which the lien attached, the collector is
under mandatory duty to enforce the lien through sale of the property,
though any failure to do so does not impair the lien. These provisions,
together with the imposition of personal liability and the appointment
of a bonded collector, should go far to make collection effective.
What of the relative merits of the preventive and punitive treatment
of delinquency provided for by the Law? Undoubtedly the installment
distribution of the tax burden ensures payment of some taxes which
STherehas been an alarming increase of such concessions. The time for paying
certain 1934 or 1935 taxes is, or may be extended under the laws of ten states.
Twenty states have waived or reduced penalties or interest on delinquent taxes,
while five have reduced the interest on future delinquencies. Seven states have postponed tax sales, and twelve have extended the time for redeeming from past sales,
usually with a reduction of interest or penalties. Finally fourteen states have allowed
payment of delinquent taxes over a period of years, usually with reduced interest
or penalties. The references to the state laws are in the paper STATE TAX LEGISLA-

TION, 1935 read by Raymond E. Manning, of the Library of Congress; pp. 22-23,
before the 1935 Conference of The National Tax Association, mimeographed copies
of which are available.
5 The full text of the law appears in (May, 1935) SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL
MuNIcIPAL REVIEw, v. XXIV, no. 5, pp. 290-305.
' The governments could finance such payments through short-term loans at
much less expense than if they were compelled to borrow without the security of
certain receipts. The problem is ably discussed by Simpson, Tax Delinquency: Eo
isesic Aspects (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 147, 157.
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could not be met in a lump sum, and would satisfactorily prevent cumulative delinquency under ordinary circumstances. Over a long depression, however, the credit facilities of the taxpayer contract simultaneously with his income, so that he might be unable to finance his tax
obligations even on a deferred payment basis. The Model Law might
well supplement its provision for installment payments, therefore, with
some plan of extending credit facilities to the taxpayer, enabling him
to maintain his property values at a marketable level, rather than allowing such values to be borne down by cumulative tax delinquency.
It might be well to investigate in this connection the accredited
lending corporations operating under the Orlove plan adopted last year
in New York.8 Municipal governments may accept tax payments from
these corporations in return for conditional tax receipts, thereby ensuring themselves of prompt payment. The taxpayer may avoid delinquency
and its ensuing penalties by reimbursing the corporation which pays
this tax, through twelve notes of equal amount, maturing monthly, at
4% interest plus a 2% service charge, with a 6% rate becoming
effective upon default of the loan. This makes credit for prompt tax
payments available to any taxpayer whose property is worth at least
more than the amount of taxes and penalties. In the event of a tax
sale for delinquent taxes, the lending corporations should serve to
stabilize at a low figure the interest rate accepted by the purchaser of
the lien. The lending corporation is itself protected against default,
for the municipality must refund to it from the proceeds of the sale
the amount due it on its loan contract with the borrower. With such a
plan the taxpayer, according to his financial circumstances, could either
pay his taxes directly in four installments without interest, or could
finance that payment through a loan to be repaid in twelve installments at a low rate of interest. It would seem advisable thus to limit
the number of installments without interest to four, as the Model Law
has done, and to charge the taxpayer with the expense of any additional leniency in the distribution of his tax obligation."
The receivership system incorporated in the Law, while of comparatively recent origin,10 bids fair to be one of the most effective, as well
as one of the most equitable means of enforcing tax liens. In 1921 a
Tennessee statute authorized receiverships in pending tax suits for the
8 Described in Paul Studenski, A Tax Finance Plan for the Collection of Delinquent and Current Real Estate Taxes (1935) 13 TAx MAG. 131.
9
The expense of tax billing and accounting should discourage unnecessary installments. Ten such installments, however, have this year been permitted under
Ohio S. B. 221. Certain municipalities have also attempted a similar method of official "savings accounts' for the payment of taxes, the results of which are unfavorably commented upon in (1934) 27 PRoc. NAT. TAx Ass'N 319, 361.
10 Such remedies are now in effect in Illinois, New Jersey and Ohio. See IL..
REv. STATs. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 120, 1 240; N. 3. STAT. SR-v. (1934) § 208-444a;
GEN. CODE Onio (Baldwin's Supp., 1934) It 5703, 5703-1, 5703-2, 115 Ohio Laws,
1934, pt. 2, House Bill 28.
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first time."1 The Kerner-Skarda Act in Illinois" and the Stout Act in
New Jersey 13 have expedited this process by authorizing receivers to
collect income on property delinquent for more than six months, even
where no suit is pending. Such legislation undoubtedly partially accounts
for the improvement of several hundred per cent in the tax collections
of Illinois. The tremendous increase represented in large part voluntary
payments stimulated by the mere threat of receivership. Such a remedy
is particularly effective against apartment houses, office buildings and
similar income-producing property, and its constitutionality would seem
beyond doubt. Certainly if the state can sell the property outright, it
could appropriate the income therefrom: the right to seize a part would
seem implied in the right to seize the whole. Nor should it be necessary
to make the tax specifically a lien on the rents and income. Receiverships for the payment of private obligations are common, although no
lien exists on the rents and income. 14 Personal property, itself free from
any lien, can be distrained for the collection of delinquent taxes on real
property.15 Certainly receivership seems less drastic than either of these
remedies.
Ordinarily the court which first appoints a receiver has exclusive
jurisdiction over the property, and other courts cannot appoint an additional receiver.1 6 Whether appointed by state or federal courts, he
must generally conform to state tax statutes* and must pay state taxes
as a preferred claim regardless of whether they became due before 8 or
during 9 the receivership. The Model Law specifically restates this duty
in all cases where the collector is made receiver of the rents and income
of the property. Such a provision, if made at all, should not necessitate
the appointment of the collector as a receiver for payments due in his
capacity as collector.
The receiver is given the power of an assignee of the rents and
11 TENN. CODE (1932) § 1602.
12 IL. REV. STATS. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 120, § 240. Discussed by Earl H. De

Long, Tax Delinquency-The Illinois Tax Receivership Act (1933) 28 ILL. L. RrV.
379.

13
N. J. STAT. SERV. (1934) §1 208-444a.
14 See CAL.. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 564 et seq.
15
Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. Bowland (1905) 196 U. S. 611; Wolfe v. De Wolfe
(1931) 53 F. (2d) 999. See also, Nickey v. Mississippi (193V 292 U. S. 393, holding
that a state may collect taxes assessed against one parcel 5f property by resort to
other parcels of property within the state owned by the same person, though he be
a non-resident.
16
Shields v. Coleman (1895) 157 U.S. 168; Palmer v. Texas (1908) 212 U.S.
118; Tenth Nat. Bank of Philadelphia v. Smith Construction Co. (1910) 227 Pa.
354, 76 Atl. 67.
1
Gillis v. California (1934) 293 U. S. 62.
18 Marshall v. New York (1920) 254 U. S. 380; Witt v. Jones (1925) 106 Okla.
227, 233 Pac. 722.
to Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co. (1932) 286 U. 5. 334; Coy v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1915) 220 Fed. 90; Central Trust Co. v. N. Y. and N. R. Co.
(1888) 110 N. Y. 250, 18 N. E. 92.
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income of the property, and is authorized to pay expenses necessary
to keep the property tenantable. Since he need post no other than his
official bond as collector, it would seem advisable to require, as a protection to the property owner, court approval of such expenses. The
narrow scope of his powers probably precludes the receiver from actually managing the property. It might, however, be well to authorize him
to make and renew leases and to undertake other contracts in the
management of the property, subject of course to court approval. Some
provision should also be made allowing the property owner to petition
for termination of the receivership in the event of mismanagement.
The Model Law should also make clearer the relationship between
the receivership provisions and the tax sale provisions. It places the
collector under mandatory duty to piforce liens by sale on the October
first following the end of the fiscal'year on which they have attached.
At the same time it authorizes the appointment of the collector as
receiver of any property on which the taxes or any instalment thereof
have been delinquent for more than six months. Some confusion might
arise from the overlapping dates of these remedies. Must the property
be sold, even though it is already in the hands of the receiver? If so,
what becomes of the receivership? Would it be automatically terminated by the tax sale or would it continue in order to repay the purchaser at the tax sale, and thus redeem the property? If the May 1st
installment were delinquent, the property could be sold before the
receivership provisions could apply. Should receivership be allowed for
property which has thus been sold? These problems, together with
that of the proper time for enforcing the personal liability, could be
simply resolved by providing that the remedies be cumulative, and
that no action taken to secure collection of the tax shall be construed
as an election to pursue one remedy to the exclusion of others.
The mandatory tax sales provided by the Model Law must be
continued from day to day without adjournment. The sale is at public
auction for the amount of the lien to any person who would purchase
the property subject to redemption at the lowest interest rate not in
excess of 127 per annum. The purchaser is entitled to semi-annual
payment of the interest stipulated at the sale and to prompt payment
when due of all subsequent taxes and other municipal charges which
may become a lien upon the property. Failure of the owner to comply
with these conditions gives the purchaser an immediate right to foreclose the right of redemption. The purchaser obtains a certificate of
sale which, if not recorded within three months of the date of sale,
is void against a bona fide purchaser, lessee, or mortgagee whose deed,
lease or mortgage is recorded before the recording of the certificate.
Property for which there is no other purchaser is sold subject to redemption at 10%c per annum to the taxing district which has the same rights
as other purchasers. The Law authorizes a private sale of the certificate
for not less than the amount stated therein, together with the municipal
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liens subsequently charged against the property. Any person having
an interest in the property may redeem within one year from the date
of sale, or thereafter until the right to redeem is foreclosed, by paying
the amount stated in the certificate, interest, and expenses of the purchaser incident to the sale. Alternative proceedings in personam or
in rem are provided for the expeditious foreclosure of the right of
redemption.
These provisions need clarification. Some ambiguity, for example,
inheres in the provision that the certificate of sale shall be "presumptive
evidence" of the truth of the statements therein, of the purchaser's title,
and of the regularity and validity of the sale and related proceedings.
The phrase "presumptive evidence" has in the past led to considerable
confusion." It creates a doubt whether the introduction of the certificate raises a mere presumption which is permanently dispelled by counter
evidence, or whether it makes out a prima facie case which must be
considered together with the counter evidence. The certificate should
je given more weight than a mere presumption. If the purchaser is to
be adequately protected the certificate should be made prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements therein and the regularity and
validity of the sale and related proceedings.
The Law further provides that after two years from the recording
of the certificate of sale no evidence shall be admitted in any court to
rebut the presumptive evidence of the certificate except in cases involving fraud. The constitutionality of such provisions is questionable,21
although they are sometimes sustained as statutes of limitation. 22 It is
arguable that the right to prove that the property was exempt from
taxation, that notice of sale was not given, or other facts as essential
as those relating to fraud cannot be taken away without a denial of
due process of law.
It would seem advisable also that the period within which presumptions may be rebutted should run from the time the certificate is issued
rather than from the date of its recordation. Why should the purchaser
be under the necessity of recording the certificate of sale? The interest
of the certificate holder during the period of redemption is not made
clear, but whatever his interest the collector's records should show the
existence of the lien and constitute sufficient notice to all persons
dealing with the delinquent owner. Bidding for the property should be
encouraged by minimizing the requirements of purchasers to those
essential to the rights of the delinquent. It would seem no more necessary for the purchaser to record the certificate than for the municipality
to record the levy of the tax. Judgment rendered in the foreclosure
20See

Edmund Morgan, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof (1933)

47

MRn. L. REV. 59; Notes (1932) 20 CAL.r L. Rav. 189; (1930) 4 Cue. L. Rav. 89;
3 Wooaons, Evmanc. (2d ed. 1923) 1 1436; S ibid. s 2490 to 2494.
n See 2 Wroxoas, EvaENCE (2d ed. 1923) £ 1333; Marx v. Hanthorn (1893)
148 U1.S. 172.
*(1906) 8 L. R. A. (x. s.) 137, 160.
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proceedings, however, giving title in fee simple, should be recorded
since it removes the lien and creates a new title which might not appear
in the records of the tax collector.
There is no sharp distinction between the in personam and in rem
proceedings provided for the foreclosure of the right of redemption.
Some differentiation might exist if personal service is required in the
one whereas only service by publication is required in the other. Since
the certificate holder, however, may elect the procedure he desires to
follow, a simple provision that either- personal service or service by
publication at the option of the holder would obviate any necessity
for two distinct proceedings. Perhaps the Law intended to make a
personal judgment available in the in personam, but not in the in rem
proceeding, since it explicitly provides that no personal judgment shall
be entered in the in rem proceeding. A personal judgment, however,
might be precluded by the absence of specific authorization as well as
by the provision that the final judgment in such proceeding shall give
the certificate holder title in fee simple. This provision makes clear
that neither a sale of the property nor a deficiency judgment is contemplated in such proceeding.
The personal liability imposed by the Model Law is limited to
residents on the ground that its extension to non-residents might be
unconstitutional in view of Dewey v. Des Moines2 and City of New
York v. McLean. 24 The first case invalidated a personal judgment
against a non-resident for an improvement assessment upon real property. The non-resident, however, never appeared in any of the proceedings leading up to the levying of the assessment and was not personally
served with process in the state. The second case held that personal
liability for a tax levied by the City of New York could not be imposed,
under the statutes involved in that case, upon a non-resident, even
though he were personally served in the state. Neither case involved
the constitutionality of a statute explicitly imposing personal liability
upon non-residents personally served with process in the state. Subsequent cases in the state courts on this precise issue have uniformly
held such statutes valid.2 The United States Supreme Court in Bristol
v. Washington County" did much to explain the scope of its decision
in the Des Moines case in stating that "What was ruled there was
that a citizen of one State cannot be cast in a personal judgment in
another State on an assessment levied there on real estate for a local
improvement without service on him or voluntary appearance, or some
action on his part amounting to consent to the jurisdiction." These cases
23 (1899) 173 U. S. 193.

24 (1902) 170 N. Y. 374, 63 N. E. 380.
a Greenbaum v. Commonwealth (1912) 147 Ky. 450, 144 S. W. 45; Collector
of Taxes v. Rising Sun Street Lighting Corp. (1918) 229 Mass. 4o4, 118 N. E. 871;
State v. Baker (1930) 35 N. M. 55, 289 Pac. 801, cert. den. (1930) 282 U. 5. 807.
See Note (1931) 44H~ny. L. REv. 1265.
M (1900) 177 U. 5. 133, 146.
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would justify the extension of the provision to non-residents personally
served within the state. Nothing would be lost by the inclusion of such
a provision and much might be gained if it proved valid. Certainly a
state should make every effort to avoid discrimination against its own
citizens by subjecting all taxpayers to the same liabilities. It is probably
true that any property in the state upon which execution could be levied
in satisfaction of a personal judgment might also be reached by distraint proceedingS27 or by attachment,28 thus avoiding the constitutional questions just discussed. A personal judgment, however, would
operate less harshly, and might also form, although the question is still
an open one," the basis of an action in other states in which the taxpayer has property that could be reached to satisfy the judgment.
Collections under the Model Law might be greatly facilitated by
the consolidation of assessment and collection procedure within coordinated taxing districts. While the introduction to the Law recommends
serious consideration of such unification of tax functions, such a plan
is quite properly excluded from the Law itself in view of the political
and constitutional differences of the various states. The Law limits itself
to a provision that the assessed values of the largest taxing unit shall
be uniform for all districts entirely within its limits. Similarly the
appointment, tenure, powers and duties of the assessor, the method of
appointing the collector, the description of assessed property, and the
extent of state supervision over local tax authorities are properly left
by the Law to each state to work out against its own background.
The incorporation of certain other details through supplementary
legislation is also left to each state. The Law, for example, does not
provide for notice to the taxpayer of the values placed upon his property, nor for hearings before the tax board for the equalization of his
assessment. The tax calendar is suggestive only; this perhaps explains
the omission of a fixed tax day. One might by implication assume it to
be January 10th, the day fixed for completing the assessment list and
filing it with the board of taxation. It could, however, plausibly be
October 1st, when the assessing begins; any date between October 1st
and January 10th, as determined by the assessor; or any day between
January 10th and July 1st, depending upon when the tax rate is finally
fixed. The establishment of a specific tax day would obviate any confusion resulting from changes in ownership, changes in the exempt
status of property, fluctuations in values, destruction of property,
erection of new buildings, and the attachment of personal liability for
taxes.
27 See Scottish Union etc. Ins. Co. v. Bowland (1905) 196 U. S. 611.
2 See Nickey v. Mississippi, supra note 15.
2 See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 265; Moore v. Mitchell
(1929) 30 F. (2d) 600. Ci. People of State of New York v. Coe Mfg. Co. (1934)
112 N. 3. L. 536, 172 Atl. 198, cert. den. (1934) 55 Sup. Ct. 89; (1935) 83 U. or PA.
L. Ray. 387; Halewood, Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcement of
Tax Judgments (1934) 19 MARQUETTEK L. REV. 10.
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The introduction to the Model Law raises a question regarding the
desirability of either transforming any real property subject to a
municipal lien into municipal property not in the custody of the law,
or making the lien indestructible, and therefore enforceable, after the
close of bankruptcy proceedings. It is doubtful whether a state statute
could now withdraw such property from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court without conflicting with the power of the federal government over bankruptcies.a Numerous casesa1 hold that the bankruptcy
court acquires the exclusive right to administer all property in which
the bankrupt has a beneficial interest. Title and right to possession of
all property owned and possessed by the bankrupt vests in the trustee
as of the date of filing the petition for adjudication in bankruptcy,
regardless of whether the property is situated within or without the
district in which the court Sits.8 2 Only an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act would clearly legalize the transformation of bankrupt property subject to a tax lien into municipal property. Such a change, however, would frustrate the marshalling of all the assets of the bankrupt
for a final adjustment of his affairs. Ordinarily the value of property
greatly exceeds the amount of the taxes claimed due, and it would
accordingly be unjust to withhold that excess from other creditors. The
municipality is already adequately protected by a lien upon the proceeds of the bankruptcy sale and its prior claim for the payment of
the taxes due.
The creation of an indestructible lien would probably be unconstitutional under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Van
Huffel v. Harkelrode,83 holding that under the general equity powers
of the bankruptcy court and the powers implied from Section 2 of the
Bankruptcy Act, an order could be entered directing that real property be sold free and clear of encumbrances, including state tax liens.
The Model Law would not operate retroactively to liquidate the
abnormal amount of existing delinquency. It could, however, be supplemented by a related program, adapted to the local situation, for
liquidation of tax arrears, involving perhaps receiverships for incomeproducing property, and the active execution of tax sales. The tax
collector could in many cases distinguish between voluntary and involuntary delinquency, and adjust his method of enforcing the lien
accordingly. Such a program, reenforced by organized tax payment
campaigns, would hasten the realization of frozen assets, and encourage
municipalities to undertake with greater security the provisions of the
Model Law for installment payments.
80 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus (1929) 278 U. S. 261; New York v. Irving
Trust Co. (1933) 288 U. S. 329.
81 White v. Schloerb (1900) 178 U. S. 542; Murphy v. John Hofman Co. (1909)
211 U. S. 562; Herbert v. Crawford (1912) 228 U. 5. 204; Lazarus v. Prentice
(1914) 234 U. S.263; Straton v. New (1931) 283 U. S. 318.
8Isasv. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co. (1931) 282 U. 5.734.

** (1931) 284 U. S.225, commented upon in (1932) 20 CAW~z. L. REV. 645.
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Property with a record of chronic delinquency has sometimes been
restored to local tax rolls, as in Nebraska," through sale, unencumbered
by liens, to the highest bidder. It is a dangerous if heroic remedy, however, to sell property for less than the amount of accrued taxes. It
would always be possible for the government involuntarily, or the taxpayer deliberately to underestimate the value of the property. Once
the precedent were established of selling property for less than the
amount of accrued taxes, the effectiveness of any tax sales as a method
of enforcing liens would soon be destroyed. In any event little could be
lost by removing such property from the tax rolls and either devoting
it where possible to some permanent municipal use or at least withholding it from private ownership so long as it were unable to yield
taxes under such ownership.as
Roger I. Traynor.
ScHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE,
UrrxRiTy or CALIIORNIA.

REORGANIZATIONs;

AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE

SECURITIES AcT.-The Division of Corporations has adopted certain
rules governing corporate reorganizations, certificates of deposit and
definitive securities which are set forth in Chapter 36 of the Rules of
Practice of the Division of Corporations. These rules were commented
on in the March number of the California Law Review in a note' which
dealt with the interaction of the State Corporate Securities Act, the
Federal Securities Act and the Federal Corporate Reorganization
Act. These rules of practice were developed by the Commissioner of
Corporations in order to meet the exemption set forth in Section 3(a) 10
of the 1934 Federal Securities Act, which exempted from Federal regulation securities to be exchanged for outstanding securities:
"where thv terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, aiter a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and condition at
which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange
shall have the right to appear, by . . . governmental authority expressly
authorized by law to grant such approval."

These rules set forth in Chapter 36 of the Rules of Practice concerning reorganization hearings were promulgated by the Commissioner of
Corporations under the express grant of rule-making power and under
the express grant of authority to issue permits authorizing the issue of
securities.: The minimum findings required to be made to satisfy the
Nr.a. CosP. STAT. (1Q29) 1 77-2039.
ar"See Lent D. Upson, Tax Delinquency: Administration and Legislation (1934)
27 Paoc. NAT. T.kx Ass'N 356, 365.
1Note (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REv. 348.
3
NAT. BAiqxauprcy Act 1 77B, 48 STAT. (1934) 91; Note (1935) 23 CAX.Jr. L.

Ray. 348-351.
8
CAL. CORP'ORA SECUarrI.S Act I 5, Cal. Stats. 1931, p. 943.

1089

24 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

exemption in Section 3 (a) 10 of the Federal Securities Act exceed the
minimum findings required under the California Corporate Securities
Act. Under the California Act it is only necessary that the Commissioner
find that the issue is not unfair, a negative finding. rather than make
the minimum finding required by the Federal Act --that it is fair to
make the exchange of securities."
In order to remove any doubt as to the Commissioner s authority to
make the positive finding that the issue of securities in exchange for
outstanding securities is fair, the 1935 legislature adopted the following
amendment to the second paragraph of Section 4 of the Corporate Securities Act:
"Pursuant to this act the Commissioner has been and i authorized, in
the instance of an application for a permit to issue securities in exchange for
one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claim', or property interests,
or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, to approve the terms and
conditions of such issuance and exchange and the fairness of such terms and
conditions, . . . at which all persons to whom it is propo,;ed to issue

securi-

ties in such exchange shall have the right to appear."' 4

This measure was adopted as emergency legislation -nd was approved by the Governor on May 17, 1935, becoming effective immediately.
Chapter 36 of the Rules of Practice of the Division of Corporations
has been amended to conform with this emergency legislation. (Copies
of these rules are available for public distribution at nominal cost at any
office of the Division of Corporations.)
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT MADE SUBJECT TO CORPORATE
SECURITIES AcT

In many reorganizations a committee representing holders of bonds
or securities upon which the issuer was in default as to interest or principal or other requirements of the trust indenture. in order to act effectively in behalf of large numbers of holders of outstanding securities,
has arranged for the solicitation of the deposit of such securities with
the Committee. Such deposit is made under an agreement giving the
Committee control over the securities for the purpose of carrying out
the reorganization plan. The holder of the outstanding security in these
cases has been given a certificate of deposit in exchange for his security.
The issue of such certificates of deposit has been subject to the Federal
Securities Act when issued in interstate commerce. Pract icaliy every
important security issue, although originally issued entirely within the
State of California, was found by the Reorganization Committee to be
held in part outside the state at the time the certificates of deposit were
to be issued by the Committee. This necessitated compliance with the
registration requirements of the Federal Securities Act with the consequent cost. labor and loss of time. There was also the disadvantage of
the unfamiliarity of the district Federal authorities with the facts already fully known to the California Division of Corporations.
* Cal. Stats. 1935, c. 166.
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Unfortunately the 1933 Corporate Securities Act of California specifically exempted from its jurisdiction any issue of certificates of deposit
to holders of outstanding securities, so that there was no possibility of
a hearing under Chapter 36 of the Rules of Practice to avoid registration
under the Federal Securities Act. In these cases the Reorganization
Committee either had to act without the benefit of authority from certificate holders, or if it wished to issue certificates of deposit, it had to
comply with the Federal Securities Act.
In order to cure the lack of authority of the Commissioner of Corporations over the issue of certificates of deposit and thus gain the benefit
of exemption from the Federal Securities Act the 1935 legislature amended
the Corporate Securities Act, Section 2(a) 7 defining the term "security"
expressly to include "certificates of deposit" and to repeal the former
exemption of certificates of deposit in that definition.
The 1935 legislature also amended the fee section of the Corporate
Securities Act, Section 26 (10) to provide that the fee for filing an aDplication for a permit to issue certificates of deposit shall be $25 plus
a sum as estimated by the Commissioner to cover the actual expenses of
noticing and holding any hearing in connection therewith.
Of course after authority to issue and the issuance of the certificates
of deposit by the Committee, there may be an exchange of modified or
new securities for the outstanding securities, obligations, or property
interests in carrying out the complete reorganization plan. In such case
an additional permit must be applied for and obtained to authorize the
issue of such modified or new securities.
FEES

The Corporate Securities Act was further amended by the 1935 legislature in relation to the fee schedule for applications for permits in
general for the purpose of bringing the fees more nearly in line with
the experience of the Division of Corporations as to the approximate
cost involved in handling applications for permits, it having been found
that the old schedule of fees did not approximate the cost of handling
applications. The new fees start with fifteen dollars instead of ten as a
minimum and set the amount within said minimum up to five thousand
dollars value of paid securities for which application is filed. The schedule
then provides for an additional percentage between certain minimum
and maximum amounts, the percentage decreasing as each bracket increases in amount.'
Donald A. Pearce.
Dapurt CoMMIssoN.ER OF CORPORATIONS,
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See section 26 of CAz.. ConRoRATn Swarranas Acr, as amended by Assembly
Bil 1663, effective Sept. 15, 1935.

